The 13th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) took place on 25-26 November 2021 via videoconference under the theme “strengthening multilateralism for shared growth”. ASEM has major untapped potential but remains a valuable platform for dialogue and the exchange of information for its members.
On 1 December 2021, the EU launched its brand new infrastructural development scheme – “The Global Gateway”. By pledging to mobilise up to 300 billion EUR in investments by 2027, the EU is adding significant firepower to its toolkit of economic statecraft.
In view of the growing tensions and most recent developments in Lithuania’s relations with China, this op-ed assesses the causes of their current dispute, related EU perspectives and the potential for a 27+1 approach towards China.
More than half a year has passed since the military coup in Myanmar by the Tatmadaw. This has put an end to a decade-long period of democratic transitioning, which started in 2011 under Prime Minister U Thein Sein (Hlaing 2016). In October 2021, eight months after the coup, the situation in Myanmar is still far from stable.
China seeks to strengthen its circumpolar ties to gain legitimacy as an Arctic stakeholder. Meanwhile, the EU is following a similar path, attempting to balance the display of restraint and the desire to secure its own geopolitical interests in the Arctic region.
Thanks to an uninterrupted presence of Chinese investors in Afghanistan, favored by China’s more welcomed non-interference policy, there seems to be room for a stronger role of Beijing in Afghanistan’s state re-building process. While the Taliban is seeking help from the international community as a whole, and in spite of the fact that the EU is going to disburse a significant amount of money in the form of aid, it is uncertain whether the conditional approach endorsed by the EU will grant it a possible central role in the future of Afghanistan’s development.
After the initial proposal of a joint strategy in April 2021, the EU formally released its Indo-Pacific strategy on 16
As the EU is asserting itself as an Indo-Pacific player by working with existing multilateral groupings, it maintains a degree of strategic ambiguity, especially regarding China. While this ambiguous stance may limit cooperation with the Quad on traditional security issues, the Quad and the EU hold the potential to jointly deliver on several, cross-domain transnational issues.
The proposed CBAM policy has been met with vehement opposition from the BRICS countries and major exporters. The EU must engage with its external trade partners to ensure it meets its emissions commitments by 2050. The question is how?