In view of the growing tensions and most recent developments in Lithuania’s relations with China, this op-ed assesses the causes of their current dispute, related EU perspectives and the potential for a 27+1 approach towards China.
In September 2021, EU Commissioner for the internal market, Thierry Breton, visited Japan and South Korea to corral international support for the ‘EU Chips Act’, a strategy aimed at enhancing European production capacity and research in the field.
Who is Fumio Kishida, the new leader of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party succeeding Yoshihide Suga after his stepping down as Prime Minister? Standing for the 31 October 2021 general elections we look ahead and assess who he is and what he represents within the party and for the country.
Tehri Hakala, the newly appointed EU Special Representative for Central Asia visited the region in August 2021. What can we expect from her term as EUSR and what are the EU’s priorities in its relations with the region?
Thanks to an uninterrupted presence of Chinese investors in Afghanistan, favored by China’s more welcomed non-interference policy, there seems to be room for a stronger role of Beijing in Afghanistan’s state re-building process. While the Taliban is seeking help from the international community as a whole, and in spite of the fact that the EU is going to disburse a significant amount of money in the form of aid, it is uncertain whether the conditional approach endorsed by the EU will grant it a possible central role in the future of Afghanistan’s development.
Last September Cambodia became the fifth country to ratify RCEP, the biggest trade agreement signed to date. This mega-deal has been met with some skepticism, particularly from unions in Asia, concerned for RCEP’s lack of labour provisions. Meanwhile, through the Indo-Pacific strategy, the EU has compromised at engaging with RCEP signatories and reinforce a rules-based international order.
As the EU is asserting itself as an Indo-Pacific player by working with existing multilateral groupings, it maintains a degree of strategic ambiguity, especially regarding China. While this ambiguous stance may limit cooperation with the Quad on traditional security issues, the Quad and the EU hold the potential to jointly deliver on several, cross-domain transnational issues.
The proposed CBAM policy has been met with vehement opposition from the BRICS countries and major exporters. The EU must engage with its external trade partners to ensure it meets its emissions commitments by 2050. The question is how?
Holding a near monopoly in semiconductor manufacturing, Taiwan should seek to sustain the global supply chain and maintain its “silicon shield”. In particular by expanding its outreach abroad through cooperation with other partners such as the EU.