China – EIAS

EU-China Trade: Facilitating Bilateral Trade Through a Joint Fiat-Backed Stablecoin

This EIAS Briefing Paper explores the implementation of a joint, fiat-backed stablecoin as a tool for facilitating EU-China Trade, which reached a valuation of approximately 762 billion USD in 2024. Despite the high volume of Bank-to-Bank (B2B) transactions, bilateral trade remains tethered to inefficient financial infrastructure characterised by high foreign exchange (FX) markups, third-party reliance, and settlement latencies. These frictions impose systemic costs and lock up billions in working capital. This paper proposes a private fully-collateralised stablecoin pegged to a 50/50 basket of the Euro (EUR) and Offshore Renminbi (CNH). Blockchain architecture and smart contract automation offers the potential of near-instantaneous completely transparent settlement and reductions in transaction costs to a fraction of traditional transfers.

Japan at odds again with its own History

Japan has a new Prime Minister and faces challenges both old and new. A comment from an opposition politician led Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to make a statement on a possible commitment from the Japanese Navy to protect Taiwan. The response from China was quick, but the implications for Takaichi are more telling. Will she reposition Japan globally, or be stopped by the same forces that forced Shinzō Abe to halt his ambitions?

Chinese Banks in the EU: Structures, Functions and Regulatory Challenges

Chinese banks have established themselves in the European Union as key players in financing trade, investment, and business activities between Europe and China. Their special institutional structure in the form of the ‘branch-cum-subsidiary’ model, often established in Luxembourg, allows for high financial flexibility, but also brings regulatory tensions. At the same time, new European regulations on banking supervision, investment control, and economic security are changing the framework of their activities within the union. This leads to challenges and new requirements for a balanced and reciprocal design of EU-China financial relations.

India and China Re-engage at the SCO: A Signal of a Shifting Multipolar Order

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) 25th Summit in Tianjin, China, the image of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi clasping hands captured a shifting geopolitical order. Once dismissed as a merely symbolic forum, the SCO is emerging as a platform for financial innovation, technological coordination, and diplomatic thaw—most notably between India and China. Its evolution signals a broader attempt to redefine the architecture of global governance.

EU-South Korea-Japan: Revitalizing Defence and Security Ties in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

The global inter-state cooperation landscape is changing. In this regard, the geopolitical situation detonated by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine has produced two main areas of convergence between Europe and Northeast Asia. First, shifting geopolitical alliances and security challenges have fostered a renewed understanding of defence in all its facets in both regions. Second, thanks to their engagement through NATO and strengthened bilateral cooperation, the EU, Japan, and South Korea are also gaining momentum for enhanced trilateral security cooperation. In doing so, the three partners may be facing an array of challenges, but the opportunities for collaboration are present and continue to be growing.

Hungary and Serbia: China’s New Offshore Manufacturing Hubs in the EU?

Chinese greenfield investments in Europe are on the rise, reshaping the landscape of foreign direct investment. Instead of mergers and acquisitions, Chinese companies are increasingly setting up new operations, particularly in Hungary and Serbia. This shift is driven by factors like the EU’s tighter investment screening and China’s strategic focus on long-term market presence. Greenfield investments, especially in sectors like electric vehicles and renewable energy, offer Chinese firms fewer political hurdles, while supporting local economies. How are these investments shaping EU-China relations and offering new opportunities and challenges for European policies?

From BRICS to BRICS+: India, the EU and Shifting Global Power Dynamics

From 22 to 24 October 2024, the sixteenth BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia. During this event, the initial members of the organisation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) were joined by Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), marking the launch of BRICS+. Just a few weeks later, Indonesia, the most populated country in Southeast Asia, also joined the expanding group.

Roundtable Discussion on China’s Relations with Belgium in view of shifting geopolitical dynamics in the EU and around the world

On Wednesday, 18 December 2024, EIAS hosted a closed-door roundtable discussion with H.E Fei Shengchao, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of Belgium and distinguished experts and academics to discuss “China’s Relations with Belgium in view of shifting geopolitical dynamics in the EU and around the world.” The discussion was held under the Chatham House Rule. Introducing the ABC of Sino-Belgian relations, the focus of the discussion was directed at A) America-China relations being at the core of global politics; B) Belgium and Brussels serving as a hub in Europe connecting East and West; C) China and Change; D) the Draghi report, development, growth and competitiveness; and E) the European Union as a key actor, commemorating 50 years of EU-China relations in 2025.

The EU’s Semiconductor Dilemma: What Does it Take to Regain Strategic Autonomy?

To counter a looming change in balance of global power, the US and the EU have adopted respective de-risking measures, whereby supply chains are diversified and onshored to decrease strategic dependencies against China’s geoeconomic leverage. As China’s semiconductor ecosystem grows more strategic, and US measures more pressing, the EU must wager its position between a democratic ally to Washington and a willing trade partner to Beijing. More importantly, to preserve its technological advantage in the semiconductor industry, the EU needs to regain its strategic autonomy.