Floating cables or the pledging of a Dutch warship, these are but the most recent chapters in the story of the South China Sea. As tensions are rising between China and the Philippines, this Op-ed delves into the significance of the South China Sea and possible European responses to the recent occurrences.
On 7 December 2023 the EU and China held their 24th Summit in Beijing. At their first in-person summit since 2019 European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang in two separate sessions. Anticipations for the summit’s outcome remained modest due to prevailing challenges in EU-China relations. Despite the low expectations and the lack of a joint statement in conclusion, the summit offered a forum for EU and Chinese leaders to meet face-to-face, discuss topics of key importance and emphasise the need to uphold mutually beneficial relations.
More recent global competition has reignited outer space curiosity, as well as the use of it as an illustration of a country’s competency, capability, and focus. Those States able to reach outer space by their own means demonstrate their power due to the financial strain required. Pushing back the limits of human exploration and establishing such ‘firsts’ conveys prestige and notoriety. The most recent ‘first’ was achieved on 23 August 2023. That day, the Chandayaar-3 mission led to an Indian lander known as Vikram touching down on the Lunar South Pole. There it dispatched its rover, Pragyan. This mission made India the fourth State to land an unmanned probe on the Moon after the US, Russia, and China. Moreover, it made it the first State to reach the lunar south pole.
In the quest to achieve the EU’s ambitious 2050 net-zero carbon emissions target, renewable hydrogen has emerged as a critical element in the green energy transition. Although hydrogen is promising as a clean-burning fuel and energy carrier, its energy-intensive production and high costs pose a challenge for large-scale implementation. China and the EU are key players in the global hydrogen landscape but still primarily rely on fossil-fuel heavy methods of production. As both have released a number of strategic objectives as part of their respective hydrogen strategies, the renewable hydrogen sector is set to change over the next couple of years. The EU’s ambitious targets and China’s strategic goals for the renewable hydrogen sector create an opportunity for collaborative efforts. This EIAS policy brief will explore the chances and challenges for EU-China collaboration in the renewable hydrogen sector, emphasising the fields of fuel-cell technology, electrolyser manufacturing, and renewable energy production and trade.
In 2013 China launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to increase globalisation and connectivity primarily through infrastructure projects. Through these projects, China aims to make economic gains as well as support the host country’s infrastructure, as many of the 150 signatories on the initiative are Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and to close the global infrastructure gap.
German carmakers Volkswagen (VW), BMW and Mercedes-Benz are increasing their presence and Foreign Direct Investments in China, which is showing new investment patterns. The Chinese Electrical Vehicle (EV) expertise and technology, together with the country’s large market, could help the European automotive industry to retain global competitiveness and further its electrification process. In this context, the EU should place the European automotive industry’s interests at the centre of its green transition. Apart from the growing political scepticism and potential competition, economic collaboration with Chinese companies and the need for a broader understanding of the Chinese market as well as related strategies will become increasingly important in the long term.
When Lord Jim O’Neill, a former Goldman Sachs economist, coined the acronym “BRIC” in 2001 to describe the economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, he hardly foresaw that a formal BRICS political grouping, including South Africa, would emerge. Fast forward to the 2023 BRICS Summit, the group is now expanding. The Johannesburg II declaration, issued on 23 August 2023, offers a formal invitation to the Argentine Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to become full members of BRICS from 1 January 2024 onwards. The expansion came as a surprise to many and left some wondering where BRICS is heading, as well as what the expansion will mean for other actors such as the EU.
On 19 June 2023 all attention turned to the Hamburg harbour in Germany, where the terminal operator “Hamburg Haven and Logistics AG” finalised a significant deal with the Chinese ports operator “Cosco Shipping Ports Limited.” This deal, involving the acquisition of a stake in one of the container terminals, had encountered controversy and public- and political opposition, resulting in a subsequent reduction from the initial 35% stake to a 24.9% for Cosco. The Hamburg harbour case study provides valuable insights into the intricate landscape of international investments and geopolitical considerations. This op-ed will provide a nuanced account of the case study, delving into the key actors, the rationale behind the investment as well as the German federal government’s decision to limit the stake, and tracing the origins of the backlash it faced.
As the world recovers from the Covid-19 pandemic and the global order is shifting, new opportunities are arising for cooperation and enhanced coordination on international infrastructure development. This EIAS Briefing Paper examines the potential and risks for collaboration between China and Europe on their respective connectivity initiatives, and assesses potential challenges, pitfalls, as well as pathways to accomplish this. This is done by (1) illustrating the potential and risks of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; (2) explaining the impacts and changes that have emerged since the pandemic; (3) examining the other actors’ connectivity and infrastructure initiatives, including the EU’s Global Gateway; (4) listing the modes for cooperation; and (5) recommending channels through which to overcome challenges associated with coordination on infrastructure initiatives.