The fourth EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum and the first under new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, got underway in Brussels on 20–21 November 2025, bringing together 64 countries for discussions against a backdrop of mounting geopolitical tension and accelerating regional competition. The roundtable discussions were divided into three major themes: security priorities in the face of current geopolitical development; shared prosperity, economic security, and digital connectivity; and, lastly, common endeavours for a clean and sustainable future. Analysts were not expecting major developments to come out of this iteration, as the format tends to lean towards highlighting successful commitments and simply keep the dialogue flowing to streamline understandings and fortify existing relations.
When it comes to the messages projected to the outside world through press briefings and closing remarks, maritime security stands out as being at the core of collective Indo-Pacific–EU cooperation, together with the importance of cyber security, economic security, and sustainable connectivity. Maritime security, as one of the central topics of this Forum, was addressed in the broadest sense of its meaning. Good examples illustrating the breadth of discussions under this heading include topics ranging from freedom of navigation to the environmental risks posed by Russia’s shadow fleet, as well as potential avenues for cooperation between the EU and its Indo-Pacific partners on these and related challenges.
In addition, a high-level event on the Protection of Critical Maritime Infrastructure took place in the context of IMPF. During the Forum, participants noted the shared challenges facing the security of critical infrastructure across the region. Recent incidents affecting cables in the Baltic Sea, the Red Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea highlight growing vulnerabilities to hybrid threats and state interference. The Forum aims to address these issues through strengthened cooperation, better situational awareness, and more resilient technologies.
The ASEAN Member States underscored the focus on digital-economy growth, supply-chain resilience, and cybersecurity, which align with the EU’s strategic interests in the region. At the same time, partners emphasise the need for concrete, long-term projects backed by the EU. The Forum focused more on reaffirming past achievements and the attainment of identified objectives, rather than outlining concrete new measures. With time slipping away for the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy to capitalise on the current momentum and pressing issues demanding attention, the Forum produced limited tangible results. Just a week before, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) Forum was held in Kuala Lumpur, where Prof Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah stressed the deeply intertwined nature of ASEAN’s economic security with the region’s shifting geopolitical landscape and how it subsequently became a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific security. Furthermore, ASEAN-Malaysia National Secretariat Director-General Datuk Zanariah Zainal Abidin noted that the AOIP strategies rely on cooperation in the following priorities, encompassing areas such as maritime security, connectivity, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and economic cooperation. In addition, ASEAN partners are increasingly emphasising the narrative of ASEAN centrality.
Two conclusions can be drawn when assessing the two Forums:
- ASEAN’s sense of centrality is not merely rhetoric but a strategic necessity for them. It would be wise for the European Union, therefore, to emphasise ASEAN’s central role and operate with respect for it, listen closely to the region’s priorities, and understand how ASEAN perceives its own security landscape. Working through ASEAN mechanisms and empowering its role in the region will be critical to ensuring sustainable and legitimate, long-term engagement. It will become even more important for the EU to demonstrate its willingness to work with the region and to act upon it.
- The AOIP’s priority areas align closely with the EU’s recently stated Indo-Pacific strategic ones. Maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development, and economic resilience form a substantial zone of overlap. These shared agendas are not abstract, they constitute a range of practical entry points for meaningful cooperation on the ground. The EU will need to capitalise more on these convergences in order to transform broad strategic alignment into concrete joint initiatives and answer the call for more concrete, long-term projects.
Captivating Opportunities in Traditional Weaknesses
Now appears to be a good time for the EU to act, as US tariffs are unsettling the region and countries are looking to the EU in their diversification effort, when identifying alternatives and more reliable partners. Many welcome a deeper European engagement as a means of diversifying their strategic partnerships and carving out a regional ‘third way’ amid intensifying great-power rivalry. With the newly released US National Security Strategy further increasing geopolitical uncertainty, this opening for the EU becomes even more evident, as key Indo-Pacific countries such as the Philippines are largely absent from the official strategy document.
Despite Germany, the Netherlands, and France having successfully pushed for the adoption of a common EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the perception still exists that interests diverge and there is an absence of a unified narrative. As a result, this weakens Europe’s voice in the Indo-Pacific. The EU’s engagement is therefore considered uneven and disjointed. Competing national agendas and the lack of strong coordination mechanisms have produced a policy position that is more reactive than strategic. Without a coherent collective voice, European initiatives risk overlapping or even working at cross-purposes, undermining their ability to capitalise on the current momentum with tangible on-the-ground action.
This leaves regional partners uncertain about how substantive EU engagement truly can be, despite the voices for stronger engagement in the Indo-Pacific raised in the institutions. With Europe’s political attention, economic resources, and diplomatic efforts being heavily occupied by the urgent crisis with Russia’s war against Ukraine, energy is diverted away from Indo-Pacific efforts. As a consequence, many regional players may end up leaning more towards other long-standing partners, especially if the EU’s engagement remains inconsistent or fragmented. If such perception persists, there may be little incentive to buy into a deepened, long-term European partnership.
To demonstrate the seriousness of its commitments to its Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union should close the gap between formal dialogue and real operational capacity, ensuring its actions on the ground match its stated ambitions and are paired with the required financial resources. One way of achieving this can be by leveraging already established private-sector presence and expertise to simultaneously bolster its regional security architecture, deepen economic ties, and positively inspire regional standards across trade, technology, and environmental governance. This would help to back up initiatives by credible resources and engagement. In other words, smart collaboration with established and visible companies in the tech, defense, maritime, and energy sectors in the region could offer a practical way to bridge the EU’s ambitions with its operational capacity in the Indo-Pacific. Member State companies could play a key role in operationalising a coherent EU Indo-Pacific strategy, while at the same time, they may be more willing to set aside differences and collaborate, recognising that a unified approach would directly benefit their own national companies through newly directed resources.
Leveraging Private-Sector Anchors in ASEAN – From BlackBerry to Thales
Canada’s unexpected success in Southeast Asia can serve as a convincing example for the EU. After pivoting from hardware to cybersecurity, the Canadian giant BlackBerry established a regional hub in Malaysia, training over 5,500 professionals and embedding itself in ASEAN’s digital governance networks. This private-sector presence delivered diplomatic influence exceeding Canada’s formal government initiatives, demonstrating how sustained, commercially motivated engagement can improve security, capacity-building, and regional credibility.
The BlackBerry-style model depends on a single, agile company serving as a visible regional anchor for government officials, delivering both commercial and strategic outcomes, focused on ASEAN. Speaking with one foreign policy voice and coordinating effectively with a single company has enabled Canada to pull this off. The EU, on the other hand, presents a unique case due to the interplay of a wide range of actors and a diverse set of strategic priorities, which shape its external engagements. This entails that Canada’s example is to be presented less as a one-to-one blueprint for the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy but more as a pointer toward different, potentially valuable approaches.
Three sectors stand out in particular and are worthwhile to take a deeper look at: (cyber) security, digital connectivity, and energy. These are the areas where the EU has ample opportunities to advance its economic and security goals by backing concrete, on-the-ground capacity-building through established European companies already embedded in the region. This approach should deliver outcomes that are visible and tangible to Indo-Pacific partners, strengthening both trust and long-term cooperation. By anchoring this in an EU-led approach that brings national companies under a single strategic umbrella, the European Union could project a unified face. Policy-makers should be warned, though, that this requires careful EU coordination mechanisms to align Member State priorities, secure EU-level backing, and ensure that private-sector-led initiatives reinforce collective EU objectives rather than national ones. Pooling the knowledge and expertise derived from participation with local public and private actors will be key to elevate and spread the attained synergies throughout the region as a whole. Ultimately, the aim is to create a rippling effect in the Indo-Pacific which inspires local and EU companies to co-create more, moving towards greater common interests and mutually beneficial goals.
A first practical example could be the French multinational aerospace and defence corporation Thales. With expertise spanning cybersecurity, secure communications, critical infrastructure, all the way to naval security, Thales possesses both the technical credibility and commercial incentive to serve as a regional reference point for EU engagement. By strategically supporting Thales’ operations in the Indo-Pacific through potential co-branding, funding, and diplomatic backing, the European Union could leverage the company to strengthen economic ties and bolster regional security networks. The French giant already has a strong presence across the region, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Backing this approach with a coherent EU-wide strategy would allow for meaningful capacity-building initiatives, where local personnel can train alongside EU-supported teams, improving both operational capabilities and mutual understanding. This model would not only enhance the EU’s visibility and credibility in the Indo-Pacific but also deliver tangible security improvements on the ground, fostering partnerships that are practical, sustainable, and mutually beneficial. It is a strategy that could boost the EU’s economic presence and strengthen security at the same time. By demonstrating sustained engagement through a long-established company in the region, the EU would give real weight to its statements at the last IPMF.
Another champion is the French-German Airbus, which has a significant track record throughout the Indo-Pacific, with longstanding partnerships in countries like China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. For example, Vietnam, where Airbus has a long-standing partnership dating back almost 30 years, is where Airbus became the first Western-type aircraft to be deployed in the country.
EU-funded capacity building through Airbus’ invaluable presence and local anchoring could provide the necessary trust through the company’s longstanding relationships. Simultaneously, it can spread expertise in areas the EU has set out to improve on, as the multinational aerospace company operates across a range of core EU strategic domains, including defence, and satellite-based connectivity and data services, positioning it as a key European footprint for advancing economic, security, and connectivity initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
Lastly, in the sustainable energy sector, the Spanish company Iberdrola could play a pivotal role in strengthening energy security and connectivity, as it continues to expand its strategy in the Indo-Pacific to consolidate itself among the world’s biggest renewables companies. In Australia, Iberdrola has become one of the country’s principal developers of renewables. It has also stepped up its investments across the region, acquiring Sowitec Vietnam’s 550 MW green pipeline. Moreover, Iberdrola maintains a strong presence in Japan, where it is developing offshore wind projects. Additional initiatives with a clear EU footprint, led by an already well-established energy giant, demonstrate a tangible long-term commitment through active investment in the region and foster the trust needed to deliver on the strategy and ambition set out during the November 2025 Ministerial Forum.
Anticipating a More Action-Packed Future
The example of Blackberry, alongside the significant potential of champions of Thales and Airbus, and the growing prominence of Iberdrola, illustrates how a private-sector model could offer the EU strategic advantages and valuable entry points for enhanced future engagement on the ground. By harnessing the established companies’ competitive strengths while aligning commercial incentives with EU strategic goals, Brussels can advance its interests and showcase its commitments more effectively. These companies offer the added advantage of sitting at the intersection of several core EU priorities—security, connectivity, and economic anchoring—allowing the EU to pursue a more holistic strategy that addresses multiple goals simultaneously.At the same time, partnering with established European companies through capacity-building initiatives provides a practical way of signalling long-term commitment. It shows that the EU values regional expertise and seeks to bolster local capabilities rather than imposing external solutions—an approach strongly consistent with the principle of ASEAN Centrality. Crucially, the momentum is already there, as are the opportunities for the EU to elevate its strategy to the next level. It is never too late to start and get off the beaten path, and the time to act is now.
Author: Tim Moreels, EIAS Junior Researcher
Photo Credits: European Union