Relations between the European Union and South Korea are entering a new phase. What began as a successful trade partnership with its FTA signed in 2009 is gradually expanding into cooperation in defence, energy and advanced technologies. This shift may not be accidental. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has once again raised questions about the reliability of American security guarantees and the stability of global trade rules. For both Brussels and Seoul, two advanced but strategically vulnerable economies, closer cooperation is becoming a pragmatic response to an increasingly uncertain international environment. Trade remains the foundation of EU-South Korea relations. Since the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 2011, economic ties between the two partners have expanded significantly. By 2025, trade in goods between the EU and South Korea reached roughly €123 billion, almost doubling compared with levels before the agreement. The structure of this trade reflects the technological sophistication of both partners: South Korea exports vehicles, electronics and machinery to Europe, while the EU exports industrial equipment, chemicals and high-value manufactured goods.
Yet trade relations today cannot be separated from politics. One of the defining features of Donald Trump’s economic policy, both during his first presidency and now again, is the use of tariffs and economic pressure against allies and competitors alike. European governments have already experienced this dynamic during Trump’s earlier administration, when tariffs were imposed on European steel and aluminium. South Korea has faced similar pressure through threats of tariffs on key industries such as automobiles. For two export-oriented economies like the EU and South Korea, such developments are particularly worrying. Both depend on global markets and stable trade rules. In a world where the United States may increasingly prioritise domestic industry and bilateral pressure tactics, strengthening economic partnerships among like-minded economies and middle powers becomes a rational strategy. Closer EU–Korea trade cooperation can therefore be understood not only as an economic choice, but also as a form of strategic hedging.
Security cooperation is another area where recent geopolitical developments have pushed Europe and South Korea closer together. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has transformed the European security landscape and revealed serious limitations in European defence production. European governments have struggled and still do to replenish military stockpiles while simultaneously increasing defence spending and modernising armed forces. South Korea has emerged as an increasingly important partner in this context. South Korea possesses a sophisticated defence industry capable of producing advanced military equipment quickly and at a competitive cost. Poland’s procurement of K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and FA-50 combat aircraft from South Korean manufacturers illustrates the growing depth of defence cooperation between Europe and Seoul. In recent years, South Korea has rapidly emerged as one of the world’s leading arms exporters, steadily expanding its presence in international defence markets.
This growing cooperation must also be understood in the broader geopolitical context, particularly the uncertainty surrounding the future strategic posture of the United States. Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned the financial commitments of American allies and pushed them to increase defence spending prioritising buying from US arms manufacturers. While NATO remains central to European security, the possibility of a less predictable American leadership pushes European policymakers to diversify security partnerships where possible.
South Korea faces similar strategic considerations. The country remains dependent on the United States for deterrence against North Korea, yet Washington’s strategic focus is increasingly shifting toward competition with China. Moreover, the renewed escalation of tensions in the Middle East during Donald Trump’s presidency has also had wider economic consequences for Asia. Disruptions to oil supply routes and rising energy prices have affected many economies in Southeast and East Asia, which remain exposed. Countries such as South Korea, Japan and several Southeast Asian states rely on Middle Eastern crude for the majority of their oil and gas consumption, making them particularly vulnerable to geopolitical shocks in the region. In this environment, strengthening ties with other advanced like-minded partners, including the European Union, provides additional strategic flexibility for Seoul as well. These developments were even before already reflected in the growing institutional links between NATO and partners in the Indo-Pacific. At the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the four Indo-Pacific partners, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, issued a joint statement reaffirming the importance of deeper cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. The statement highlighted how security developments in both regions are increasingly interconnected and called for closer collaboration on defence innovation, emerging technologies and support for Ukraine.
Energy cooperation represents another important dimension of EU–Korea relations. Europe’s attempt to reduce dependence on Russian energy following the invasion of Ukraine has led to renewed interest in nuclear power as a stable, low-carbon energy source. The energy crisis of 2022 exposed the vulnerability of Europe’s energy system, particularly its continued dependence on imported fossil fuels and volatile global energy markets. In response, several European governments have begun reconsidering the role of nuclear energy within their long-term energy strategies, viewing it as a reliable complement to renewable sources that can help ensure energy security while supporting decarbonization goals. In this context, nuclear power has increasingly been framed within European policy debates as a strategic technology capable of fostering energy security amid climate neutrality.
South Korea has also emerged as an increasingly competitive exporter of nuclear technology. The Czech Republic’s decision to select Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) as the preferred bidder for new reactors at the Dukovany nuclear power plant highlights this trend, similar to Romania, which recently deepened cooperation with the ROK within the nuclear sector. Such projects create long-term industrial partnerships that can last for decades, involving not only reactor construction but also technological cooperation, fuel supply chains, maintenance and regulatory coordination. As European countries seek reliable partners capable of delivering large-scale energy infrastructure, South Korea’s nuclear industry is positioning itself as a potential contributor to Europe’s evolving energy landscape. Yet this apparent momentum also raises a longer-term question about the political limits of South Korea’s nuclear expansion in Europe.
KHNP has in recent years withdrawn from or stepped back from several European opportunities, including projects in Poland and the Netherlands, with Dutch officials explicitly noting that the decision followed similar withdrawals in Sweden and Slovenia. In Poland, KHNP’s exit came after its January 2025 intellectual property settlement with Westinghouse, a deal that reportedly narrowed its room to pursue APR1400-based tenders in Europe and was widely read as part of a broader strategic realignment toward the US market and SMR cooperation with American firms. The Czech case therefore looks less like proof of an unstoppable Korean advance across Europe than a possible exception carved out within tighter geopolitical constraints, especially since Dukovany appears to fall outside the restrictions affecting other APR1400 projects. Either way, the real question for Europe is not only whether South Korea can build reactors competitively, but whether it will be allowed to remain a fully autonomous nuclear partner when US commercial and strategic interests point in another direction.
In parallel, Brussels and Seoul have sought to deepen cooperation in the broader energy transition. The EU–South Korea Green Partnership, launched in 2023, created a framework for collaboration on clean energy technologies, including hydrogen, batteries and sustainable supply chains, while reinforcing both partners’ commitments to climate neutrality. South Korea’s three leading battery manufacturers (LG Chem, Samsung SDI and SK On) account for about 20% of the global market, which places the country as the second-largest battery producer worldwide after China. Generally in Europe, South Korean companies dominate with a 78% share of installed battery production capacity, while European firms hold 13% and Chinese companies 8%. Despite this strong footprint, Korean firms have been losing market share in EV batteries in recent years, dropping from 78% in 2022 to only around 30% in 2025. Meanwhile, China has increased the share from 22% to 60%. This shift was driven by the rising popularity of the more affordable LFP batteries, whose production China controls almost alone. The mentioned presence of South Korean firms is reflected in geographically concentrated production ecosystems in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary has emerged as a key hub for Korean investment (key rival of China) across the battery value chain, with Samsung SDI operating major manufacturing and R&D facilities in Göd, SK On running large plants in Komárom and Iváncsa and EcoPro BM supplying cathode materials from its Debrecen plant.
At the same time, Poland has consolidated its position as Europe’s leading lithium-ion battery production centre, driven by LG Energy Solution’s massive EV battery plant near Wrocław. These investments highlight that despite declining global market share, South Korean firms remain deeply embedded in Europe’s battery industry.
These developments may suggest that European and South Korean industrial ecosystems are gradually becoming more interconnected. European markets and regulatory frameworks provide scale and stability, while Korean firms contribute with technological expertise and manufacturing capacity. Taken together, cooperation across sectors such as trade, defence, energy and advanced technologies indicates that EU–South Korea relations may be slowly expanding beyond a purely economic partnership. Part of this shift also reflects broader geopolitical uncertainty. The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency has renewed debates in Europe and Asia about the future direction of American foreign policy and alliance commitments. While both Brussels and Seoul continue to view the United States as their primary security partner, recent developments may lead to developing additional partnerships to strengthen economic and technological resilience. In this context, closer EU–Korea cooperation can be seen less as a strategic realignment and more as a pragmatic complement to existing alliances.
Author: Antonin Nenutil, EIAS Junior Researcher
Photo credits: Wikimedia
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