The electoral process took place six months after former President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law on 3 December 2024, invoking military forces into the streets of Seoul, only to withdraw it again hours later. His justification to install martial law and call for the army stemmed from an alleged North Korean interference in South Korea soil. However, his attempt was halted after lawmakers voted to block the decree. Yoon was subsequently impeached after and formally removed from office in April 2024.
As a result, the past six months were characterised by political instability and numerous protests both against and in favour of the former president. A survey in February 2025 showed that thirty-five percent of the population were against Yoon’s impeachment. Therefore, although the election results of this past 3rd of June signal a significant step towards greater political stability, social cohesion and polarisation remain pending issues in South Korea’s society, mostly marked by gender and age divisions.
Domestically, Seoul is thus at a crucial moment. However, the stakes at the international arena are equally high. With a new administration in the United States (US) led by Donald Trump, an ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia with support of North Korea, and the crippling dismantling of multilateral organisations, South Korea’s incoming president will need to respond adequately. As conservative and liberal leaders in South Korea traditionally follow distinctive approaches to their foreign policy (e.g., ROK-Japan relations), the change of colour in the government will undoubtedly invoke a shift in the Republic of Korea’s international stances.
Up to now, no official foreign policy has been published. So far, Lee’s approach signals a foreign policy with South Korea’s interests at its core. The new President’s recent debut at the G7, as well as his statements during the electoral campaign hint at a drift towards economic statecraft and strategic pragmatism in Seoul’s foreign policy.
A more Diplomatic Approach to North Korea
North Korea has been one of South Korea’s most prevailing foreign policy topics, with various governments adopting colder or warmer sentiments and measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2025, the two neighbours are in their most distant diplomatic state since the Korean War. North Korea’s leader Kim Jung-un announced to no longer pursue the traditional goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula, calling South Korea a “hostile state” in 2024. Moreover, the deployment of North Korean troops in support of Russia in its conflict with Ukraine has also worried South Korea.
Lee has stressed the need to improve relationships with the DPRK, rejecting Yoon’s hardline approach. Nevertheless, he has emphasised this engagement will be calibrated and conditional, meaning that sanctions will be lifted only in view of verifiable North Korean concessions. So far, the new president decided to suspend loudspeaker broadcasts on 11 June 2025, a combination of k-pop and anti-North broadcasts streamed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The deactivation of these speakers, active since mid 2024 during Yoon’s administration, signals de-escalation and dialogue. Forty-eight hours later, likely as a response, North Korea’s speakers also fell silent.
Western Allies: A Balancing Act
In his last address as Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Yoon administration, Cho Tae-yul highlighted his legacy of the past three years. This included an upgrade of South Korea’s “alliance with the United States to adapt to the current security landscape.” During Yoon’s Presidential mandate, the US-South Korea alliance encompassed security, critical technology, economic security and a trilateral and enhanced multilateral cooperation with Japan (e.g., 4 Chips alliance). Yoon’s foreign policy saw significantly bolstered security relations between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, as well as closer ties with NATO. Notable examples include the August 2023 US-Japan-ROK Camp David Agreement or South Korea’s participation in the Madrid NATO Summit in 2022. Participating under the Alliance’s AP4/IP4 framework, the Asian country has since joined NATO Summits alongside Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, although not as a full member. However, Lee decided not to join the NATO Summit in The Hague on 24-25 June.
While Yoon started addressing security with the Atlantic partner, Lee chose to cope with trade first. For the new president, South Korea should be considered an equally sovereign country in its relationship with the US. While he has spoken about US-South Korea as a “special alliance,” Lee has further emphasised Seoul’s autonomy and the need for the country to not be rigidly confined by the Korea-Japan-US bloc. For now, Lee seems to signal to a more pragmatic and sector-focused relationship with Washington, particularly in shipbuilding and defence, areas in which South Korea has a comparative advantage to China.
As concerns Japan, an enhanced South Korea-Japan partnership is not a given, especially in times of liberal governments. The complex relationship between the two countries stems from the complicated history they share. As a result, Lee has promised to address the pending territorial disputes between the two countries. Nevertheless, he has emphasised the importance of developing Japan-South Korea relations in order to foster economic security and address geopolitical uncertainty. To do so,he has proposed a dual-track strategy: maintaining a principle stance on historical and territorial disputes, while cooperating in trade and security affairs. To date, Japan-ROK relations still seem promising and remain likely to advance progressively.
China and Russia
Regarding China, Yoon’s approach could be understood best by his Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul’s remarks: “an ally (US) is an ally, and a partner (China) is a partner”. This phrase hints at an explicit closer regard to Washington, contrasting its relationship with Beijing. In contrast, Lee has admitted the importance of the US-Korea relationship, but has signaled a shift in rhetoric. He has rejected being boxed into binary choices that could deteriorate Seoul’s ties with Beijing and Moscow, especially at a time of global volatility and tariff negotiations. In an interview, Lee has argued that in pursuit of its international interests, Seoul cannot turn its back on either Beijing or Moscow, stating that “Our economies are deeply intertwined with them, and geography makes separation impossible. It’s fate – our destiny.”
In terms of Russia, Seoul has closely aligned with the European Union and its sanctions regime since the start of the war in Ukraine. Most notably, South Korea has been a key arms exporter to Ukraine through Eastern and Central European countries under the Yoon administration. Yet, at a moment where Korean companies have recently expressed their eagerness to return to the Russian market, Lee’s initial position regarding Moscow still seems rather unclear. In the past, he had argued against a direct weapon delivery to Ukraine, and had been opposed to sending a team to monitor North Korea’s troops to Kyiv. However, in the G7 Summit of 22 June 2025, he has reportedly expressed agreement with the EU’s sanctions towards Russia.
A Global South Korea?
The recent G7 summit has shown a more strategic, pragmatic, and sector-oriented South Korea. During Lee’s campaign, the then-candidate stressed the importance of engaging with Europe as part of a broader diversification and economic diplomacy expansion. During the new president’s first G7 Summit, he met with leaders from Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa and the United Kingdom, signaling a broader and diversified diplomatic vision.
What Can the EU Expect From the New Administration?
Lee has a clear pragmatic vision for South Korea, focused on sectoral-based cooperation. Yet, its overarching theme seems to be promoting sovereignty, serving as an equal to its international partners in its deals. Brussels should be aware of this when engaging with Seoul. The new president has also stressed three key focus areas: technologies and norm-setting in areas such as AI, clean energy and digital infrastructure; trade and economy with South Korea’s interests in mind; and defence. These are perfect avenues for the EU to cooperate with South Korea, leveraging the existing cooperation frameworks and opening a dialogue that targets mutual benefit.
The Digital and Green Partnerships between the EU and South Korea, initiated in 2021 and 2023 respectively, should also be fully exploited. With both of them being leaders in technology and production, research collaboration and joint investment can prove beneficial at a time when technologies are increasingly part of a geopolitical competition. Initiatives such as the EU-ROK call for chips research in 2023 is a great example of what the two countries could do together in the upcoming years. In fact, the European Union could leverage its developed ties with Japan in industrial research to create similar trilateral activities between the three countries. These strategies are in line with South Korea’s intended development of its bilateral relations with Japan, as well as the EU’s economic security concerns.
Second, in an ever-changing global landscape, the European Union could prove a reliable trading partner and attractive market for South Korea, more so now in light of the United States’ looming tariffs. In this regard, the incumbent president has talked about coordination with other countries affected by the US tariffs, which could open the door for more intensive Seoul-Brussels dialogue and planning, especially given the Free Trade Agreement in place between the two partners. EU-South Korean bilateral initiatives have flourished in recent years, which is unlikely to be entirely halted under Lee’s leadership
Third, as the EU Member States are increasing their defence spending, trading with South Korea in arms exports and other related technologies will be key. Lee continues the bipartisan support for the defence industry, making it a straightforward path for enhanced EU-ROK cooperation.
While these represent opportunities for enhanced partnership, there are aspects of their relationship that may change. Lee’s decision to not attend the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague could be a signal of lesser involvement in direct security cooperation with European powers. Another contentious issue could be Ukraine, given the new president’s ambiguous position on Russia. A potential rapprochement with Moscow would be hard to understand for the European Union. Although Lee has talked about reviving ties with Moscow, he has also shown his willingness to support the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war, as well as reportedly supported sanctions against Russia in the last G7 summit.
To sum up, Lee’s public statements seem to be rather cautious and promote strategic independence and pragmatism. His speeches tend to focus on hard politics, instead of values and public diplomacy, while putting greater emphasis on his economic vision, which includes defence.
It is the right time for policymakers in Brussels to side with South Korea, further promote multilateralism and go against siding solely with one side amidst the increased US-China trade tensions. With allies such as South Korea, a sectorial, focused and pragmatic approach could benefit both partners in the long run and pave a third way among the polarised international rhetoric. The question is, however, whether Brussels is ready to make such moves in international politics and whether South Korea can be successful in the uphill battle that promoting multilateralism has become.
Author: Vera Rodriguez Corcho, EIAS Junior Researcher
Photo credits: Pexels