In the European Union (EU) questions have circulated over to what extent Europe should be concerned about the emerging anti-Western BRICS+ coalition. Some EU observers see BRICS+ as an effort by Beijing and Moscow to reshape the global order around a Sino-Russian axis, counterbalancing what they perceive as a Western dominance in multilateral fora and global affairs. However, Indonesia’s inclusion may strengthen the group of non-aligned countries, led by India. The members of the expanded group advocate for a multi-alignment approach, maintaining balanced relations with both the “East” and the “West”.
BRICS+: Towards a New Global Order?
Formed in 2006, the original BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China) gathered for the first time in 2009. They were subsequently joined by South Africa in 2011 to form the BRICS. Broadly speaking, these countries advocate to reshape international organisations such as the United Nations Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund or IMF and the World Bank Group), in a way that better reflects the rise of emerging new powers and the multipolar nature of the world in the 21st century. For instance, this could be achieved by reducing their dependence on the US dollar (de-dollarisation). This particular matter was one of the main points of attention during the 2024 Kazan Summit. Two of the BRICS’ initiatives in creating an alternative finance system have been the establishment of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB). These institutions were respectively meant to be auxiliaries of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Far from its original purpose to represent the Global South’s voice, vis-à-vis the Western traditional institutions the BRICS+ group is currently seen more as an alternative geopolitical bloc whose governments meet during annual official summits. For its members, these talks offer an opportunity to coordinate their multilateral policies.
In 2024, a second enlargement to the group occurred with the addition of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), formally creating BRICS+. Even if Saudi Arabia has claimed to be ready to join the organisation, the kingdom has also “delayed formally entering the group over reservations about the group’s character.” The last expansion occurred on 6 January 2025, when Indonesia formally joined the group.
Geopolitically, the latest BRICS expansion carries significant implications. By 2023, BRICS+ countries represented approximately 3,6 billion people, about 45% of the world’s population, with their combined economies valued at over 27,5 trillion USD, representing roughly 26% of the global GDP. In comparison, G7 countries only represent about 10% of the world’s population and 44,4% of its GDP. Also, following this expansion, BRICS+ countries now produce around 30% of the world’s crude oil. Furthermore, the group’s influence extends beyond its ten official members to its 10 partner countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. A key distinction between members and partners is that while full members play a substantial role in policy direction, partners are involved through more targeted commitments (e.g. trade, economics), without full decision-making authority. Nonetheless, although the organisation in itself could be a central partner for Western countries and organisations, this is not the case (yet). Within this framework, key powers such as Russia and China seem determined to serve as agents of change in the evolving political orientation of BRICS+. India, too, demonstrates a readiness to act as a pivotal player in this transformation. Despite a relatively lower position on the Human Development Index compared to China and Russia, India has emerged as the world’s fifth-largest economy, with a GDP of 3.5 trillion USD, as it continues to experience notable growth.
India: A Member with Global Ambitions?
Within BRICS+ India distinguishes itself through its policy of strategic autonomy, maintaining a unique stance of non-alignment. Interestingly enough, India is often seen as the most Western-oriented BRICS+ member, and appears to benefit the most from the group’s expansion.
The summit allowed New Delhi to further strengthen its ties with other founding members, particularly Russia. Examples of India and Russia’s close relationship are abound, especially since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Prime Minister (PM) Modi has met President Putin multiple times, including during BRICS+ meetings, and India has continued purchasing Russian oil, despite potential Western sanctions. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen clarified that Indian oil companies are permitted to “purchase oil at any price they want, as long as they avoid using Western services”. Additionally, India’s BRICS+ participation opened a diplomatic channel allowing careful de-escalation of tensions with China. This “reconciliation” between the two countries was highlighted by the recent agreement on the Galwan Valley, announced just before the Kazan summit. This development has likely provided Prime Minister Modi with the diplomatic flexibility needed to engage with President Xi Jinping on the summit’s sidelines.
The BRICS’ expansion itself has enabled India to sharpen its already existing strong bilateral ties with some of the newcomers. In the Middle East, Egypt has become one of New Delhi’s main trade and security partners. By the end of 2022, India was among Egypt’s fifth-largest trading associates. A few months later, PM Modi visited his counterpart in Cairo. This event was followed by visits from Indian ministers and defence officials. In addition, in 2023, Egypt joined the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB).
India can also count on Ethiopia, one of its longest-standing allies. In 2018 Ethiopia became the largest beneficiary of India’s Lines of Credit in Africa, underscoring its importance in India’s foreign policy. In this framework, India has launched several development cooperation programmes in the country, focusing on matters like rural development, agriculture, banking, healthcare, infrastructure, and renewable energy. Moreover, under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership India and Ethiopia are in the final stages of finalising a defence agreement that includes military training and defence-related credit lines. With Addis Ababa joining BRICS, New Delhi now has even stronger partnerships in both North and East Africa among the grouping’s members.
On the Arabian peninsula, it is the inclusion of the UAE which allows India to strengthen its position within the organisation. Undoubtedly, both countries have already cultivated strong commercial and trade ties. For instance, in February 2022, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Narendra Modi signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). It ensures a free and non-discriminatory trading environment between the partners, reducing tariffs on more than 80% of products, guaranteeing greater access to the Indian market for exports from the UAE. Moreover, the Emirate’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the West uses the same “one-foot in both camps” approach as India. Even if Abu Dhabi has never pretended to follow New Delhi’s “strategic autonomy” policy, it still reinforces India’s position, avoiding falling into an anti-Western bloc.
New Delhi also maintains a strong relationship with Iran, which regularly receives Indian government officials. Current relations between the two countries are marked by high-level exchanges, commercial cooperation, and cultural links. For instance, the importance of their relationship expresses itself in the energy field. India is currently the world’s third-largest oil consumer, absorbing approximately 5% of the global share and is expected to become the top consumer in 2033 due to its fast-growing industry and manufacturing sectors. To meet such significant needs, the country has developed a strategy of diversifying its oil supplies, and can currently count on no fewer than 39 sources, including Iran. In 2019, India stopped importing Iran’s crude oil to comply with US sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear programme. However, in January 2024, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar met with his Iranian counterpart to consider the resumption of oil imports. While the oil supplies Delhi currently receives from Tehran are virtually zero, the situation may still evolve along with India’s expected oil consumption and global growth.
In addition, Iran-India relations have recently been highlighted by the signing of a ten-year deal to develop and operate the strategic port of Chabahar. Through this 370 million USD deal, India seeks to reinforce its access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. By 2030, India expects to be able to handle up to 12 million tons of cargo per year. In comparison, China has invested no less than 62 billion USD in the nearby Pakistani port of Gwadar and should reach a capacity of 400 million tons of cargo per year. In addition to these economic considerations, it is in India’s interest to keep Iran closer as the country is seen to become “the most powerful nation in the region, both in capability and intent”.
Expansion – A Catalyst for Tensions?
Although the BRICS+ expansion undoubtedly tightens India’s bilateral ties with the new members, some experts, including Mark S. Cogan, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Japanese Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, estimate that “BRICS’ expansion carries more risks than rewards for India.” The enlargement may be considered a greater opportunity for Beijing, alongside Moscow, to extend their influence through BRICS+, more than for India. By supporting expansion, both China and Russia hoped to strengthen their influence in significant emerging countries. In contrast, India’s influence could diminish if the BRICS+ group’s expansion were to include members mainly aligned with China’s agenda, such as Iran. Nevertheless, this enlargement also provides Delhi with an opportunity to promote its vision of a multipolar world and non-alignment.
Another field that opposes India and China is their diverging economic models and strategies. For instance, China actively promotes its Global Development Initiative, and its well-known Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2023 Delhi engaged itself in the US-led India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC), aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan and Israël. Nonetheless, due to the numerous tensions in the region, the project has not yet taken any concrete form. That same year, following the Johannesburg BRICS Summit, Chinese state media characterised the grouping as working toward a “pluriversal world”. This concept envisions “a world that is more multipolar, more inclusive, just, equitable, a world that respects the potential and contributions of all countries to human progress”. This indicates that China aspires to extend its strategy, surpassing the US within existing international institutions by creating entirely new initiatives centred around its own vision.
While China is often perceived as dominant within BRICS+, India has similar ambitions, albeit by adopting a different approach. Although some projections have predicted its economy to surpass China’s by 2037 at the latest, the question remains how this can be achieved. New Delhi aims to leverage existing global institutions to amplify the voice of the Global South while consolidating its own influence. China on the other hand appears to be focused on rallying the Global South to support the establishment of alternative systems to those built by the US and Europe after World War II. For instance, through the BRI, China has emerged as the largest debt holder of numerous countries in the Global South, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. This reorientation could shift attention away from South Asia, where India seeks a dominant role, potentially diminishing its leverage within BRICS on issues critical to its interests.
Beyond these asymmetrical agendas of India and China, Iran’s inclusion in the group could introduce additional risks for India, despite their strong ties. In March 2021 Tehran and Beijing signed a 25-year agreement, deepening the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) footprint at the very heart of the Middle East. Through this agreement Iran, which remains under Western sanctions, is able to export its oil to China. The PRC also supplies Tehran with high-tech surveillance technologies. On the other hand, China disposes of discounts on Iranian oil exports. The agreement also represents an opportunity for the PRC to implement its BRI in Iran. Furthermore, as the country remains under Western sanctions, it has mainly redirected its oil exports to China, which benefits considerably from this.
In parallel to its interests in the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, China is said to be attracted by Iran’s maritime infrastructure in Chabahar. As Beijing has heavily cooperated with Pakistan to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it could ultimately provide Islamabad with easy access to the Chabahar Port, creating security perils for India’s local infrastructure. With such Chinese installations at its doorstep, India’s influence in the region and in the Indian Ocean could be at risk, as well as its efforts to create a Quad 2.0 parallel to the existing Quad, involving India, Israel, the UAE and the US.
Indonesia: a Game-changer in the BRICS+?
Indonesia’s entry into BRICS+ introduces a new dynamic, given its strong ties with both India and China.
On the one hand, Indonesia shares deep commercial and cultural relations with India, one of its key trading partners. Indian investments in Indonesia amount to approximately 54 billion USD, spanning sectors like infrastructure, energy, IT, and manufacturing, with Indian companies such as Tata Power and Reliance leading major projects. While Indonesian investments in India remain modest at 647 million USD, Jakarta is actively seeking to attract more investments from India, particularly for its new capital and prime industries like automobiles and pharmaceuticals. There is also significant potential between the two nations to expand trade in digital technology.
On the other hand, Indonesia maintains a strong economic relationship with China, its main trading partner, representing 21% of its exports in 2022. China’s influence in Indonesia’s economy could grow even stronger, deepening Jakarta’s reliance on Beijing. Yet, Indonesia upholds the principle of non-alignment, which is set to continue under Subianto Prabowo’s leadership. Nonetheless, closer alignment with BRICS+ could place Indonesia in a precarious position, risking potential trade retaliation under a second Trump administration.
The Union of Disunion
Considering how BRICS+ operates, the EU may not (yet) need to fear an immediate emergence of an anti-EU coalition in the near term.
The BRICS+ is a highly heterogeneous group of emerging nations that each claim a leadership role based on their respective regional influence. They are neither united by geography, nor a common ideology or culture. Their common goal seems to be focused on boosting economic and trade relations and counterbalancing traditional Western institutions, which appear to them as unrepresentative of the current multipolar world’s realities and disparities particularly from the perspective of the Global South.
Economically, the members differ significantly, making it difficult comparing them. Even if the BRICS+ countries contributed for an estimated 37% of the global GDP in 2024, they did not all participate to the same extent. China alone provided up to 19% of the global GDP while India, the second-largest BRICS+ member, accounts for 8%. The five new official full members together provided almost 6%. These gaps highlight the differences between the members’ economic structures, levels of development, as well as their diverging public policy priorities. For instance, China and India have fast-growing economies with a focus on technology and services, while Russia and Brazil are more dependent on their natural resources. Overall, the lack of uniformity complicates the implementation of common policies and a unified cooperation strategy.
Moreover, the contrasting goals between the group’s members have been compounded by internal tensions. Egypt, for instance, faces disputes with Ethiopia over Nile water management, while Iran is infringed with conflicts in the Red Sea region with the UAE and Egypt. Layered onto these regional frictions is a more subtle rivalry between Russia and China, whose cooperation masks distinct agendas. While Russia aims to reaffirm its status as a great power, China seeks regional leadership in a multipolar world through the expansion of its economic and technological influence. Evidence of these underlying tensions surfaced recently, as China reacted to reports of North Korean troops joining Russia’s forces in its war against Ukraine.
Another matter that may hold back the creation of a full-fledged anti-Western system through BRICS+ is the intrinsic structure of the organisation. The BRICS+ decision-making system relies on a consensus-based approach, which the group’s expansion will only render more difficult. The gathering of states with disparate economic and geographic realities also represents diverging interests. Such a framework will make reaching a consensus more complicated than among only five members. To guarantee the grouping’s consistency in the long run, internal reforms to reach a majority system may ultimately prove to be necessary. In this sense, BRICS+ could draw inspiration from the European model in which intergovernmental and supranational institutions coexist. Ironically enough, this could help democratise the overall organisation. Furthermore, despite the BRICS+ presenting itself as a champion of a more equitable world order, a critical moment will inevitably arise when its leading nations—Russia, China, and India—must critically reflect on their positions and some concessions may need to be made. If they should seek to reform the United Nations Security Council, how willing would they be to genuinely address changes to the veto power system and decision-making procedures?
Politically, the group includes a mixture of governance systems, each with their distinct goals and interests. This diversity could fuel ideological rifts, particularly over how to approach “the Global West“. While the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis seeks to create an alternative global order that challenges traditional Western-dominated organisations (by the US in particular), countries like India, Brazil, the UAE, Indonesia and Egypt favour a multi-alignment strategy that still involves cooperation with western partners. As a result, the objective of the BRICS+ appears to be shifting, focusing more on establishing a fairer global order that respects and reflects the interests of emerging nations. For these countries, BRICS+ serves as a platform to strengthen ties with the Global South. Kazakhstan for example has already refrained from joining BRICS+ to avoid being seen as too close to an “Eastern bloc”.
A European opportunity
In the middle and long term, the EU should nonetheless consider the 2024 Kazan Summit as a signal to engage more deeply and meaningfully with the Global South. For the years to come, current and future BRICS+ members may either need to align with one or another vision of foreign policy engagement within the bloc, advocating a potentially stronger anti-West position, or a more dispersed multi-alignment one keeping the existing links with the West alive.
Revitalising global multilateral cooperation with these emerging economies could enable the EU to reaffirm the role of multilateralism and international collaboration as a cornerstone of global governance, also at the UN level. This could offer the EU an opportunity to play an active role in shaping this redistribution of power. With Donald Trump soon re-taking office as US president, it remains unclear to what extent the US will still present itself as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific region. It is clear, however, that one can expect a further US foreign policy shift towards the region.
For the EU, such changes may represent a challenge but also an opportunity to deepen its ties with the BRICS+ members, including India as self proclaimed leader of the Global South. Over the last few years, the EU and India have made deepening their strategic partnership a priority, at least in their rhetorics. Through negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the establishment of a Trade and Technology Council (TTC), and the launch of the IMEC project the EU and India have intensified their collaboration on development cooperation and global governance.
In contrast, failing to acknowledge and appropriately address the legitimate demands of nations and their populations risks only deepening global divisions. To avoid such a scenario, the EU must signal its openness to a more multifaceted world by engaging in transparent negotiations on the rules that will shape the reality of tomorrow and avoiding exerting pressure on countries to adopt strict strategic alignments. On the other hand, while the EU should show the Global South it matters, the Global South should adopt the same behaviour vis-à-vis Brussels.
Author: Loïc Vanleeuw, EIAS Junior Researcher
Photo credits: Pixabay