Additionally, the recent crises in global trade have made stable options, including land-based freight across Central Asia, more attractive to international companies and governments. As with many EU international investments, a large component of it is expected to come from the private sector. It is, therefore, essential to understand the underlying framework.
The legacy of Soviet-era infrastructure—pipelines, railways, and power grids among other things—ensured that for thirty years after 1991, any genuine economic diversification from Russia would be costly and time-consuming, tethering the Central Asian Republics (CARs) to Moscow. However, with the war in Ukraine, the widespread economic sanctions imposed on Russia have impeded trade with it, having therefore accelerated the rate of decoupling of Central Asian from Moscow.
For decades, the foreign policy of Central Asian states was primarily characterised by the principle of maintaining a balancing act between World Powers, to never fall under direct influence again. The war in Ukraine sped up the rate at which these states have moved to decouple from Russia, meaning many are now looking to the EU and others as a new counterweight to the regional powers of Russia and China. Meanwhile, these states are increasingly referring to themselves as ‘middle powers,’ characterising themselves as resource-rich, diplomatically connected countries that can pursue independent development paths.
Author: Reuben Gilhooley, EIAS Junior Researcher
Photo Credits: Unsplash