The Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan
On 3 October 2023, the Government of Pakistan announced plans to repatriate “illegal foreigners,” issuing an internal directive from the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to outline the phased repatriation of Afghan nationals. This process begins with undocumented Afghan nationals, followed by ACC (Afghan Citizen Card) holders, and finally PoR (Proof of Registration) holders. The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has surged since the US military disengagement in 2021. In November 2022, Pakistan initiated an anti-migrant crackdown targeting undocumented individuals, forcing an estimated 600,000 Afghans to return home. This was followed by the first round of repatriation for undocumented Afghans in November 2023. By 23 November 2023, the Pakistani government announced plans to repatriate 1 million illegal foreigners by January 2024, resulting in over 340,000 illegal migrants –including Afghans– voluntarily leaving or being repatriated. Pakistan has cited the surge in violence and its inability to host additional people as reasons for the forced deportation. Given that over 95% of refugees in Pakistan are Afghan nationals, the repatriation plan Pakistan is preparing for is anything but minor. In a joint statement, the UN Refugee Agency, IOM (the UN Migration Agency), and UNICEF (the UN Children’s Fund) expressed deep concern for the safety and well-being of children and families impacted by Pakistan’s Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan.
In July 2024, Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, visited Pakistan and requested that the Pakistani authorities extend the duration of registration cards for Afghan refugees. During his visit, he met with Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, who emphasised Pakistan’s enduring dedication to providing a hospitable environment for Afghan refugees, despite facing several obstacles. He urged the international community to recognise the weighty responsibility that Pakistan has shouldered in this regard. He implored the UNHCR to allocate resources to assist Pakistan’s endeavours and advocate for lasting solutions, such as secure and respectful repatriation and relocation to other countries for Afghan refugees. Grandi expressed appreciation for the generous hospitality extended by Pakistan and pledged to maintain ongoing cooperation in addressing the requirements of Afghan refugees, emphasising the robust partnership between Pakistan and the UNHCR. While the UNHCR stated after Grandi’s visit that Pakistan would postpone the deportation process for an additional year, the Pakistani government has not made any official decision regarding the matter. As a result, it seems the deportations may still be ongoing, in various stages.
Historical context
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are deeply rooted in colonial history and geopolitical strategy. The Durand Line, a 2,640-kilometre (1,640-mile) border drawn between Afghanistan and Pakistan by the British in 1893 remains a contentious issue due to Afghanistan’s continued non-recognition of it. This demarcation has fueled long-standing tensions and disputes over territorial sovereignty. Another area of contention involves the use of Afghanistan in Pakistan-India relations. Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine, formulated during the Cold War, aimed to ensure influence in Afghanistan to prevent encirclement by India, is perceived as infringing on Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Consequently, Pakistan’s continued active support for the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, and later for the Taliban, has been a constant source of aggravation for Afghanistan. These actions are perceived by many Afghans as direct interference in their domestic affairs and have perpetuated a fraught and often adversarial relationship between the two nations, significantly impacting their political, social, and security landscapes. The return of Taliban rule in 2021 has brought about new and more severe challenges for Pakistan. Following the disputed 8 February 2024 elections, which were plagued by allegations of rigging and violence, the country has experienced a notable increase in unrest. This surge in violence has been particularly evident in the southwestern province of Balochistan and near Peshawar City in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the recent attacks.
In the midst of this upheaval, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been steadily worsening, as growing violence and political instability intensify tensions. The efforts of international and regional forces to improve the relationship between the two nations have been ineffective in addressing or reducing the ongoing tensions. As the scenario progresses, it prompts the essential inquiry of which international partner, notably the United States or China, possesses the capability to have significant influence over Pakistan’s political choices to influence the process.
Who Holds Leverage in Pakistan’s Future?
US-Pakistan relations are currently at a historic low, with the Biden Administration omitting Pakistan from its Indo-Pacific and national security strategies. The deterioration in relations can be attributed to several factors, including Pakistan’s deepening ties with China, seen as a competitor to US interests in the region, and its ongoing rivalry with India, a key US strategic partner. These dynamics have contributed to the decline in bilateral engagement and cooperation between Washington and Islamabad. In 2021, the United States pulled its military out of Afghanistan, marking a significant shift in its involvement in South Asia. Even prior to this military disengagement, the US had strategically deprioritised the region, focusing more on the Indo-Pacific and the QUAD alliance. This strategic pivot has resulted in a noticeable loss of influence for the US in South Asia, highlighted by surveys presenting a negative outlook towards the US in Pakistan. This shift has created a significant gap in trust, collaboration, and opportunities for dialogue between the US and countries in the region.
The once-illustrious Pakistan-China relationship, often described as “higher than the Himalayas, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel,” appears to be losing its former glory. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s recent visit to China yielded no substantial investment commitments. Chinese enthusiasm for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has waned due to delayed payments, political instability, and security concerns in Pakistan. The country’s leadership had already over-promised, so payments to Chinese power producers (IPPs) suffered. In the last three years, Chinese IPPs frequently lodged complaints over delayed payments. Moreover, Pakistan’s strained relations with Afghanistan and Iran pose additional challenges to the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into these nations, which was originally advocated by China for the project. Today the perception of Chinese influence in Pakistan as a means to offset US soft power is being challenged due to rising geopolitical tensions and unsolved regional crises. The increasing political pressures and unresolved conflicts suggest that both major powers may face diminishing leverage in the coming years. Nevertheless, as a nuclear-armed state with over 200 million people, Pakistan occupies a strategically crucial position in South Asia and along the Indian Ocean coastline. Given the diminishing influence of both the United States and China in the region, it could become imperative for other international powers to step in.
The EU’s Role in Pakistan
Pakistan faces two critical crises: the human cost of ongoing policy changes and the environmental damage from natural disasters, both of which it struggles to manage by itself. As a nuclear-armed country, Pakistan’s security dynamics are markedly different from those of its neighbours, adding a layer of complexity to its situation. For Pakistan’s future, it is essential to prioritize stable economic assistance and capacity-building initiatives without military involvement. In this context, the EU having championed before in both fields has thus a possible more prominent role to play in providing the support necessary to navigate these multifaceted challenges and stabilise the region.
While the UNHCR, Amnesty International, and others are seeking to influence Pakistan’s Afghan refugee repatriation plan, the EU wields a more meaningful leverage. As Pakistan’s largest export market, partly due to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+), the EU has the capacity and leverage to exert influence on the process. In addition, Pakistan is a beneficiary of the EU’s Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP), which provides additional support for the most urgent humanitarian needs of Afghans living in Pakistan under various statuses. Pakistan’s urgent need for economic recovery, including infrastructure development and employment opportunities, particularly in the digital sector for its youth shows the need for this help. Beyond trade benefits, the EU may increase its soft power exertion by enhancing higher education possibilities, further reinforcing its position in Pakistan’s development and stability progress. The European Union must acknowledge the strategic significance of South Asia and actively engage in addressing the region’s complex challenges. By leveraging diplomatic interventions, humanitarian aid, and strategic partnerships, the EU can significantly contribute to fostering peace and stability in South Asia.
Author: Sajla Abdul Razack, Junior Researcher
Photo Credit: Pixabay